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Abstract
We propose a simple framework to explore how di¤erent market structures in the banking
system a¤ect credit allocation, and how deposits and number of entrepreneurs a¤ect the equilib-
rium number of banks in the economy. We nd that within the Marshallian aggregate surplus
perspective, the number of entrants in the banking system is always larger than the socially
optimal number of banks.
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1 Introduction
The mechanism through which the banking system impacts economic growth by providing liquidity,
risk pooling and reducing agency problems is fairly well understood.1 Unfortunately, much less
attention has been devoted to study how market structure in banking a¤ects credit allocation and
subsequent growth. It is often argued that a departure from competition is detrimental to growth
because banks with market power restrain the supply of loanable funds by setting higher interest
rates. On the other hand, competition policies in banking may involve di¢ cult trade-o¤s. While
greater competition may enhance the e¢ ciency of banks with positive implications for economic
growth, greater competition may also destabilize banks with costly repercussions for the economy.
Within the partial equilibrium framework, the literature nds that under monopoly, the severity
of the particular bank-borrower problem is reduced.2 On the other hand, general equilibrium
models tend to nd that less competitive banking systems may be detrimental to the economy. In
particular, Smith (1998) nds a negative impact of a monopolist banking system on bank structure,
on income and the business cycle. Guzman (2000) also nds that under monopoly, banks ration
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1A few examples are Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990), Bencivenga and Smith (1991), King and Levine (1993),
and Levine and Zervos (1998) among others.
2See Riordan (1993), Petersen and Rajan (1995), and Schinter (1998) for particular instances of the bank-borrower
problem.
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credit more heavily than competitive banks increasing monitoring costs, which results in negative
consequences for capital accumulation and growth. On the other hand, Cetorelli (1995, 1997)
studies the impact of monopoly on: (1) the nancing of credit constrained rms and (2) the
screening process for new loans. In particular, he nds that a monopoly bank promotes technology
adoption and reduces screening costs but redistributes productive resources to itself rather than
potential productive agents. Cetorelli and Peretto (2000) study the market structure e¤ect on
capital accumulation. They nd that increasing the number of banks increases credit available
to entrepreneurs, but also increases costly information acquisition about the risk of entrepreneurs
projects. They show that under this trade o¤, the market structure maximizing steady state income
per capita is an oligopolistic structure (i.e. between monopoly and competitive).
Riordan (1993), Sha¤er (1998) and Petersen and Rajan (1995) provide micro level evidence
suggesting that concentration in banking may not always be undesirable. Levine (2000) nds
greater bank concentration in Chile is not strongly associated with negative outcomes in terms of
nancial sector development, industrial competition, political and legal system integrity, economic
growth or banking sector fragility. Beck, Demirguc-Kunt and Levine (2006) nd that crises are
less likely in more concentrated banking systems, in countries with fewer regulatory restrictions on
bank competition and activities, and in economies with better institutions.
In this paper we propose a simple framework to explore how di¤erent market structures in
the banking system a¤ects credit allocation. In particular, we want to determine the equilibrium
number of banks sustainable under limited resources when all banks are of equal size. We nd that
when resources in the banking system increases, the number of potential banks in the economy
also increases. This nding provides an alternative reasoning for why we tend to nd fewer banks
in developing countries in comparison to more developed ones. Furthermore, when the return
on the alternative investment of banks increases, the banks potential for higher prots increases,
inducing more banks into the banking system. We also show that when the number of entrepreneurs
increases relative to deposits, the equilibrium number of banks that can be sustained decreases.
Finally, we show that within the Marshallian aggregate surplus perspective, the number of entrants
in the banking system is always larger than socially optimal. Throughout the paper, and whenever
relevant, we discuss how our model di¤ers and our results compare to the cited papers above.
We take this paper as a rst step toward building a dynamic general equilibrium model of bank
competition with frictions. Frictions can be introduced in the lending market using a directed
search framework where entrepreneurs select over banks using mixed strategies (see Peters (1991),
Julien, Kennes and King (2000) and Burdett, Shi and Wright (2001).
2 The Model
The economy consists of N entrepreneurs and m banks. Each entrepreneurs is endowed with one
unit of labor. Entrepreneurs have the ability to activate individual-specic technologies if they
inelastically supply their unit of labor and if their project is funded. Once the technology has been
activated, their demand for capital and the proceeds of their project are observed by intermediaries.
Entrepreneurs produce the single nal good using the same constant returns to scale technology
with capital and entrepreneurial labor as inputs. In particular, let L represent entrepreneurial
labor, and let K denote total capital stock per entrepreneur. Production per entrepreneur, Y , is
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given by the following Cobb-Douglas production function3:
Y = F (K;L) = KL1 :
Let f(k)=k denote the entrepreneur intensive production function and k the per capita capital
stock per entrepreneurial unit of labor. We assume that if the project is funded, the entrepreneur
will hire her own services, and the factors of production are paid their marginal product,
w  w(k) = f(k)  kf 0(k) = (1  )k and r = f 0(k) = k 1; (1)
where w is the wage received by the entrepreneur and r is the rental rate for capital. This is
di¤erent than the Cetorelli and Peretto (2000) model where entrepreneurs provide the funds to
nal producers at the competitive rate and the latter acquire capital, hire labor and pay wages.
Our results holds under such assumption.
2.1 Entrepreneurs Behavior
When funded, entrepreneurs produce the nal good and extract utility from consumption U(c)
with U 0(c) > 0 and U 00(c) < 0. Their objective is summarized as:
max
c
U(c) s:t: c  w ) c = w =

(1  )k if funded
w if not funded;
where w represents the entrepreneurs alternative sources of income (maybe home production) with-
out capital input requirement. This alternative source of income implies that there is a minimum
amount of capital they are willing to borrow dened by w = w(k),or k =

w
(1 )
 1

. The minimum
acceptable wage simply represent an outside option for the entrepreneur. Assuming it away implies
no minimum capital requirement to induce entrepreneurs to bid for loans and do not a¤ect the
results. The outside option can also be endogenized, for example, by introducing preferences for
home production without a¤ecting the results.
2.2 Intermediaries
All lenders save through intermediaries. Although this assumption might be rationalized by as-
suming the presence of some friction, such as a relatively large minimum scale at which capital
investment can be undertaken, Freeman (1986), we do not explicitly model such a friction here. We
interpret these intermediaries as an ex ante coalition of lenders that pool resources. Intermediaries
are also assumed in Guzman (2000) and Cetorelli and Peretto (2000). Among others, Diamond
(1984) and more recently Wiliamson (1986, 1987) provide a theoretical framework modelling -
nancial intermediaries. Banks arise to overcome the asymmetric information problems since it is
costly for lenders to acquire information about borrowers and their projects. In their model, banks
have economies of scale in information extraction and gathering, and on monitoring. Modelling
intermediaries formation would not a¤ect the results but only add a prior stage to our model. To
keep our model simple we abstract from informational asymmetry between the intermediary/bank
and funded entrepreneurs. We assume that each intermediary can costlessly verify the projects
3The results are robust to a neoclassical production function satisfying the Inada conditions.
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that it has funded. Our results are robust to the introduction of asymmetric information and a
screening mechanism as used in Cetorelli and Peretto (2000).
The aggregate amount of deposits, , is assumed equally distributed among banks so that each
bank as i = =m funds. Banks have access to an alternative investment that is not entrepreneur
specic, a linear technology, whereby one unit of capital yields X units of consumption. Banks
take deposits, i, from lenders, and decide to allocate these resources between the linear technology
and/or extending credit to entrepreneurs. Although we assume an exogenous amount of deposits
(i.e. abstract from the saving and borrowing side), our results hold if were were to relax this
assumption by allowing saving and banks to o¤er interest on deposits. (see Cetorelli and Peretto
(2000). Instead of having a cost for banks in paying interest to attract deposits, we introduce an
alternative investment for banks (returning X per unit of capital) as an opportunity cost of lending
to entrepreneurs. Bonds or other such assets are examples. This assumption allows us to investigate
the impact of an increase in returns on the alternative investments on the banking structure. This
result is not present in other models cited above.
Banks allocate their funds through credit auctions. This particular mechanism for allocating
resources is commonly used in money markets. Since interest rates map one for one into prices, the
bidding behavior of banks can be interpreted as bidders submitting their true inverse demand for
funds, which are given by:
D 1(k) =

0 if k < k
f 0(k) if k  k.
Once the entrepreneurs submit these bids to all of the existing banks in the economy, credit is
allocated.
3 Oligopolistic Banking Structure
The interaction between banks and entrepreneurs is modeled as follows:
1. Banks announce the amount of funds they have available to all of the entrepreneurs in the
economy, a maximum of i = =m; i = 1; :::m, which is to be divided among the N entre-
preneurs.
2. Given the bidding behavior of the entrepreneurs, banks compete in funds.
3. Entrepreneurs submit bids to all of the m banks describing the interest rate they are willing
to pay for each amount of available funds, which is from k to i.
A representative banks prot per entrepreneur is given by i = (f 0(K) X) ki where ki is the
capital per entrepreneur given by bank i and K =
Pm
j=1 kj .
Since the bank has two distinct investment opportunities, there will be a capital threshold, after
which there will be no resources allocated to entrepreneurs. In particular, the threshold is obtained
when the return of the linear technology and the rental rate on capital are equal; i.e, f 0(k) = X,
implying k =
 

X
 1
1  .
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A representative banks overall prots is simply i = Ni. Banks maximize prots by choosing
the per entrepreneur amount of capital solving:
i = max
ki2[k;minfk;i=Ng]
N(f 0(K) X)ki = max
ki2[k;minfk;i=Ng]
N
0BB@
0BB@ki + mX
j=1
j 6=i
kj
1CCA
 1
 X
1CCA ki
We can impose symmetry since all banks are identical ex ante, i.e, kj = k;8j. The unique interior
solution for the optimal capital per entrepreneur, per bank, under oligopoly is given by:
kc(m) =
1
m


X

m  1 + 
m
 1
1 
 minfk;i=Ng: (2)
We have @k
c(m)
@m < 0 as long as m  2, with limm7!1k
c(m) = 0. Since each entrepreneur submits a
bid to all of the m banks, the total amount of capital that each entrepreneur receives is mkc(m);
which is an increasing quantity in m, 8m  1. The quantity per bank supplied in equilibrium is
Nkc(m) and each banks prot is then given by:
i(m) =

 (mkc(m)) 1  X

Nkc(m)
with limm!1i(m) = 0, the standard perfect competition outcome. The aggregate amount of
capital supplied to all the entrepreneurs in the economy is then Kc(m) = Nmkc(m).
Proposition 1 The equilibrium allocation of funds by an oligopolistic banking structure depends
on the aggregate amount of resources available as follows:
a. If  < Nmk then no lending takes place and all resources are invested by banks in the linear
technology.
b. If  = Nmk, each entrepreneur obtains its minimal capital mk = mi=N = =N , and
each bank lend all their available resources Nk = i = =m.
c. If Nmk <  < Kc(m), each entrepreneur obtains mi=N = =N , and each bank lend all
their available resources Ai = =m.
d. If Nmk < Kc(m) < , each entrepreneur obtains mkc(m), and each bank lend Nkc(m) to
entrepreneurs and invest (i  Nkc(m)) in the linear technology.4
When the resource constraint is not binding, more banks in the economy increases capital
per entrepreneur, increases total output, reduces the interest charged on loans and increases the
wages that entrepreneurs receive. This result implies that under a monopoly bank (m = 1) the
economy would experience its lowest capital per entrepreneur, total output, highest interest on
loans, and lowest wages. The partial equilibrium results corroborate those of Guzman (2000) and
Cetorelli and Peretto (2000), respectively, in either moving from competitive to monopoly bank, or
4The proof follows directly and is omitted for simplicity.
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from reducing the number of banks in a general equilibrium model with oligopoly banks screening
borrowers. However, when the resource constraint is binding, each entrepreneur gets its minimal
capital. Moreover, the constraint may be so severe that no lending takes place. Notice that under
an oligopoly or monopoly banking structure, prots are realized. We assume that prots simply go
to the exogenous intermediaries as in Cetorelli and Peretto (2000). However, the results hold if we
were to assume that aggregate prots are equally redistributed to borrowers (entrepreneurs).
3.1 Entry in the Banking System
Let m be the free entry number of banks. The equilibrium number of banks depends on the
resource constraint. When the constraint is non binding, k  =N , the free-entry condition yields
an innite number of banks. This is veried by the zero prot condition i(m) = 0, which yields
mkc(m) =
 

X
 1
1  = k. The only way for this equality to hold is when m 7! 1. If the resource
constraint is binding, =N < k, then the free-entry condition gives a number of banks that solves
mkc(m) = =N , which results in:
m =
(1  )
 X  N 1  :
Comparative statics yields:
@m
@=N
=
(1  )2X  N  
N

 X  N 1 2 > 0 and
@m
@X
=
(1  )  N 1 
 X  N 1 2 > 0:
First, since m is increasing in =N , there is a minimum amount of per-entrepreneur deposits
below which only a monopoly bank will serve the entrepreneurs. Second, when the return on the
alternative investment of banks, X, increases, the banks potential for higher prots increases,
inducing more banks into the banking system. Third, when the number of entrepreneurs, N ,
increases, the sustainable number of banks in the economy decreases, reecting that banks are
more constrained by aggregate deposits when facing more entrepreneurs competing for funds. Each
banks reaction as modeled by quantitycompetition is to increase funds available as evidenced
by Kc(m), being strictly increasing in N .5 Since banks resources are limited in the aggregate,
this uncoordinated desired expansion cannot be realized by all banks. Given that deposits are
equally distributed among banks, the only way for such expansion to materialize is for some banks
to attract away deposits from other banks. This leaves two alternatives for each bank: either
attract deposits away from other banks or let other banks attract away its deposits and exit the
industry. Although the actual process through which banks lure deposits away from other banks
is not explicitly modeled here, this simple structure suggests the following intuition. Banks must
o¤er the highest interest rate possible to depositors in order to attract more funds. An upward
pressure in demand for funds created by more entrepreneurs requiring funds would induce banks to
bid up the interest earnings o¤ered on deposits, leading to lower prots and inducing some banks
5Note that these derivatives are well dened as long as X
 
A
N
1  6= or as long as Kf 6=A: When Kf= A the
equilibrium number of banks under free entry converges to innity.
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to exit the industry. Our ndings then suggest that a competitive banking system with innitely
many banks may not always be possible.
These ndings are consistent with Robinsons (1952) observation that the need for a large
nancial intermediation sector is not justied when there are not enough savings or demand for
direct investment.6 Our ndings then provides an alternative explanation other than di¤erences
in the structure in the tax system, tax compliance, industrial policy, political corruption and the
e¢ ciency of the legal and accounting system, of why we tend to nd less concentrated banking
systems in more developed countries than in less developed ones. Barth, Caprio and Levine (2001)
nd that the average concentration index in high income countries is 63.75, 66.48 for upper middle
income countries, 72.35 for lower middle income countries and for lower income countries is 72.91.7
Using their data, one can calculate that OECD members have an average number of banks equal
to 763.4, while non-OECD countries have a much lower average of 48.4 banks. Considering the
average number of banks per 100,000 habitants, we nd that for OECD countries the average is
8.9 and for the non-OECD countries is 0.7.8
4 Entry in the Banking System and Welfare
This section compares the free entry number of banks with the number maximizing social welfare.
We use the Marshallian aggregate surplus as measure of welfare given by:
W (s) =
Z A=N
0
f 0(s)ds mX:
The socially e¢ cient number of banks is an integer that maximizes W (s), denoted by mo.
Proposition 2 Assume that mk(m) < A=N and (a) mk(m) is strictly increasing in m, (b) k(m)
is strictly decreasing in m and (c) i(m) > 0;8m, then the equilibrium number of entrants m, is
at least mo + 1, where mo, is the socially optimal number of entrants.
Proof: See appendix.
Conditions (a) requires the aggregate output increases when more banks enter the banking
sector, condition (b) requires that the rental rate on capital is never below the return on the linear
technology regardless of the number of rms entering the industry, and nally condition (c) says
that each bank makes positive prot regardless of the number of entrants. All these conditions are
satised in our framework for all m < m. The regulator would like to have fewer banks than under
free entry. The tendency for excess entry in the presence of market power is fundamentally driven
by the business-stealing e¤ect. When business stealing accompanies new entry and price exceeds
marginal cost, part of the new entrants prot comes at the expense of existing banks, creating an
excess incentive for the new bank to enter.
6Over the course of an economys development, its nancial sector grows in size relative to the rest of the economy.
But whether nancial development causes economic growth has been di¢ cult to determine. See for example, King
and Levine (1993).
7Barth et al use the World banks classication when sorting countries according to their income level. The
concentration measure they use is the percentage of deposits accounted by the 5 largest banks in a given country.
8When computing these average we excluded countries that have o¤shore banking. The OECD classication used
in this exercise is the one used by World Bank.
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5 Conclusion
We developed a simple static framework to explore how di¤erent market structures in the banking
system a¤ect credit allocation. The framework is suitable to analyze how entry is a¤ected by limited
resources in the banking system. We show that when resources in the banking system increases, the
number of potential banks in the economy also increases, providing an alternative explanation for
bank concentration. We nd that when the return on the alternative investment of banks increases,
the banks potential for higher prots increases, inducing more banks into the banking system. A
result not investigated in existing models. We also show that when the number of entrepreneurs
increases relative to deposits, the equilibrium number of banks that can be sustained decreases.
Finally, we show that within the Marshallian aggregate surplus perspective, the number of entrants
in the banking system is always larger than the socially optimal number of banks. This is a simple
partial equilibrium model corroborating the main ndings of existing general equilibrium models
on the relationship between credit constraints and banking structure. We take the model as a rst
step toward building a general equilibrium model of bank competition with frictions in the lending
market to explore similar issues. Work along this line is in progress by the authors.
6 Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1. The result is trivial if mo = 1, so suppose that mo> 1. Under the
assumption of the proposition, i(m) is decreasing in m. To establish the result, we just need to
show that i(mo) < 0. In order to prove this, note rst that by the denition of mo we must have
that W (mo) W (mo + 1)  0, orZ (mo+1)k(mo+1)
mok(mo)
f 0(s)ds  (mo + 1)X +moX  0:
Using i(mo + 1) = (f 0((mo + 1)k(mo + 1)) X) k(mo + 1), we have
i(m
o + 1)  f 0((mo + 1)k(mo + 1))k(mo + 1) 
Z (mo+1)k(mo+1)
mok(mo)
f 0(s)dsk(mo + 1)
 f 0((mo)k(mo))k(mo + 1) > 0
Therefore i(mo + 1) > 0, which implies m < mo. Finally, mo < 1 since mok(mo) < A=N and
mok(mo) is strictly increasing in m.
References
[1] Barth, J., G. Caprio, and R. Levine (2001) The regulation of banks around the world,World
Bank Working Paper. No 2588.
[2] Beck, T., Demirgurc-Kunt, A. , and R. Levine (2006) Bank concentration, competition, and
crises: First results, Journal of Banking and Finance, 30, Issue 5, 1581-1603.
[3] Bencivenga, V., and B. Smith (1991) Financial intermediation and endogenous growth,
Review of Economic Studies, 58, 195-209.
8
[4] Burdett, K., S. Shi, and R. Wright (2001) Pricing and Matching with Frictions, Journal of
Political Economy,109, 1060-1085.
[5] Cetorelli, M. (1995) The role of credit market competition on promoting technological
progress, manuscript.
[6] Cetorelli, M. (1997) The role of credit market competition on lending strategies and on capital
accumulation, Federal reserve bank of Chicago Working Papers 14.
[7] Cetorelli, M., and P. Peretto (2000) Oligopoly Banking and Capital Accumulation, Federal
reserve bank of Chicago Working Papers 12.
[8] Demirguc-Kunt, A., and R. Levine (2000) Bank concentration: Cross-country evidence,
World Bank.
[9] Diamond, D. W. (1984) Financial intermediation and delegated monitoring, Review of Eco-
nomic Studies, 51, 393-414.
[10] Freeman, S. (1986) Inside money, monetary contractions, and welfare, Canadian Journal of
Economics, 19, 87-98.
[11] Greenwood, J., and B. Jovanovic (1990) Financial development, growth and the distribution
of income, Journal of Political Economy, 98, 1076-1107.
[12] Guzman, M. (2000) Bank structure, capital accumulation and growth: a simple macroeco-
nomic model, Economic Theory, 16, 421-455.
[13] Julien, B., J. Kennes, and I. King (2000) Bidding for Labor, Review of Economic Dynam-
ics,3, 619-649.
[14] King, R., and R. Levine (1993) Financial and growth: Schumpeter might be right, Quarterly
Journal of Economics, 108, 717-737.
[15] Petersen, M., and R. Rajan (1995) The e¤ect of credit market competition on lending rela-
tionship, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 110, 407-443.
[16] Peters, M. (1991) Ex Ante Price O¤ers in Matching Games Non-Steady States, Economet-
rica, 59, No 5, 1425-1454.
[17] Riordan, M. (1993) Competition and bank performance in Mayer, C. and X. Vives (eds.)
Capital Markets and Financial Intermediation, Cambridge University Press.
[18] Robinson, J. (1952) The generalization of the general theory in The Rate of Interest and
Other Essays London: Macmillan.
[19] Sha¤er, S. (1998) The winners curse in banking, Journal of Financial Intermediation 7,
359-392.
[20] Smith, R. (1998) Bank competition and macroeconomic performance, Journal of Money
Credit and Banking, 30, 793-815.
9
[21] Williamson, S. D. (1986) Costly monitoring, nancial intermediation, and equilibrium credit
rationing, Journal of Monetary Economics, 18, 159-179.
[22] Williamson, S. D. (1987) Costly monitoring, loan contracts, and equilibrium credit rationing,
Quarterly Journal of Economics, 102, 135-145.
10
